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Abstract 
I develop a model of competition between walkable shops, and other shops whose customers drive 
(car-oriented shops). Walkable shops operate in monopolistic competition within a local area, or 
neighborhood. A small cost advantage for car-oriented shops can turn into a larger price advantage. 
High prices in walkable shops effect a regressive transfer from poorer to richer consumers, since the 
poorer are less likely to have cars. Internalizing environmental and social costs of urban automobile 
use could reduce prices and increase capacity utilization in walkable shops in more densely populated 
local areas. Many common combinations of planning and pricing tools fail to internalize important 
costs, and may actually subsidize driving to shop, but a combination of planning and the pricing 
(through taxation) of retail parking could effectively internalize the relevant costs. 
 
Keywords: walkability, monopolistic competition, retail, parking tax 
JEL codes: L13 R11 R32 R48  
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1. Introduction 
This paper presents a model in which consumers choose between buying from relatively small 
local retail shops to which they can walk, and from superstores to which they must use motorized 
transport. It shows that a small cost advantage for car-oriented shops can lead to a large price 
advantage; walkable shops, if they survive at all, are then left in the role of convenience stores, with 
high prices, limited local competition, and high excess capacity. This is, however, a two-way street: if 
residential density is sufficient, and if the environmental and social costs of motor vehicle use were 
internalized, the cost advantage could shift back to walkable shops. 
‘Walkable’ shops are retail and consumer service establishments mixed into, or within walking 
distance of, their customers’ residences. Such shops are regarded by many as a desirable feature in 
human settlements, whether village or megopolis  (Evans 1999), and are at the centre of ‘New 
Urbanist’ and ‘smart growth’ discourses. Walkable settlements are seen to produce widespread health 
benefits from exercise, stronger and safer communities, and better environments for children and the 
elderly. Yet they have been in steady decline in many developed countries, and in some (the USA, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand) they have all but disappeared. Moreover, where walkable shops 
exist, they tend to be high in price relative to car-oriented shops. In countries where car-oriented 
shopping is dominant, New Urbanist initiatives have struggled to establish walkable retail that is not 
high-priced – a convenience or a luxury – if, indeed, it exists at all (Falconer et al. 2010). 
Not all observers, of course, view this as a problem: the decline and disappearance of communities 
with walkable services is seen by some as a largely desirable consequence of growing income and 
reduced travel costs (Brueckner 2000). I argue that while growing incomes and reduced travel costs 
contribute to the phenomenon, Brueckner’s analysis is wrong, on three levels. First, there are direct 
external costs of urban car use; these go well beyond the costs of traffic congestion and greenhouse 
gasses (Litman 2009). Second, as I show below, failure to internalize these costs does not merely 
subsidize car-oriented shops, but actually raises costs and prices, and reduces variety, in walkable 
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shops; increased prices and reduced variety in walkable shops induces further car use, with the 
attendant external costs. Third, since the use of car-oriented shops raises prices and reduces variety in 
walkable shops, it imposes an uncompensated welfare cost on non-drivers, who depend on walkable 
shops. This distributional consequence is independent of the reason for the lower net costs for drivers 
of using car-oriented shops; that is to say, it occurs whether the car oriented shops are cheaper 
because of a failure to internalize costs of driving, or because of differences in logistical efficiency or 
land prices. The model thus sheds light on the problems of ‘food deserts’ (Whelan et al. 2002), and of 
the poor paying more (Chung and Myers 1999).  
An implication of the model presented in this paper is that while planning may help achieve certain 
conditions which are necessary for walkability, planning will not be sufficient in a world where many 
people have cars: pricing of the externalities associated with motor vehicle use is also necessary. 
Moreover, the most commonly applied pricing schemes – taxes on CO2 or motor fuel; tolls on bridges 
or inter-urban highways; road pricing, generally cordon charges, geared for the reduction of 
congestion in town centers or major arteries; and fees for parking in commercial neighborhoods – are 
all inadequate to the task, alone or in combination. Indeed, in the absence of more appropriately 
targeted pricing, some of these measures actually undermine the viability of walkable shops. 
The model is presented in Section 2; implications are discussed in Section 3; conclusions are 
presented in Section 4. 
 
2. A model of walkable shops in competition with car-oriented shops 
Building on Guy (2007), I develop a model with two kinds of shops (walkable, and car-oriented) 
and two kinds of consumer (driver and non-driver). Walkable shops here are walkable from the 
consumer’s home: while some of the same issues arise with, say, walkable CBDs, shopping in and 
near residential areas is the focus of this paper. Walkable shops within a local area, or neighborhood, 
are in monopolistic competition; we can think of this as spatial competition between walkable shops 
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located at different points in the local area. Car-oriented shops are assumed to be in perfect 
competition. All consumers are either drivers or non-drivers; for drivers, the cost of travel to car-
oriented shops is lower than it is for non-drivers. 
Before considering the technical details of this model, let us examine some of the assumptions. 
The stark division between walkable and car-oriented shops is, of course, a stylization: most car-
oriented retail is walkable for some consumers, and most walkable shops have some customers who 
arrive by car. Still it is useful, for analytical purposes, to make a sharp distinction between two 
logistical systems, one of which typically uses larger retail facilities and lower-priced land but 
depends on the extensive private use of automobiles, the other of which typically uses smaller 
facilities and more expensive land but does not require the use of private automobiles (a third 
logistical system, home delivery, is of growing importance but beyond the scope of this paper).  
The scale and location of car-oriented services, together with reduced residential density and other 
changes in the built environment, have led to a situation when in many countries most people do not 
live within walking distance of competitively priced basic retail services for even the most mundane 
products. Hence, 93% of shopping trips in the US, 59% of those in Germany were made by car in 
2001/2 (Buehler 2011) while in Britain in 2010 the figure was 65% (Transport 2010).  While the 
proportion of shopping trips taken by car in the countries just mentioned has not changed much in the 
past decade, in any country we can find periods of years where that proportion was increasing, as 
walkable shops were displaced by car-oriented ones: in New Zealand, the share of shopping trips in 
which the shopper drives a car rose from 48% in 1990 to 60% in 2004 (Harding and Powell 2010); in 
the Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto area, the proportion of shopping trips done by car rose from about 4% in 1970 
to about 36% in 2000, and “energy consumption for shopping trips has increased with a much larger 
rate than that for trips for all purposes. Underlying this is the change in shopping behavior, from foot-
based visits to neighborhood shopping streets or grocery stores to auto-based visits to faraway large-
scale retail stores” (Kitamura et al. 2008).  
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There are of course many cases to the contrary – cases in which retail services thrive in walkable 
environments, sometimes in fairly large facilities (though not, it must be said, with individual 
hypermarkets on the scale of their largest car-oriented counterparts). Such can be found in parts of 
many European and Asian cities, and of Manhattan, at least, in North America. The existence of such 
cases is not in conflict with the model presented here; indeed, without them, this paper would be much 
less interesting, because the model presented here is most relevant if the widespread decline of 
walkable retail has occurred despite fairly small differences in minimum average cost, and not due to 
its decisive technological obsolescence as a means of delivering goods. The continued existence – 
and, in some instances, revival – of retail which is walkable, and which even consumers who have 
access to cars might choose to use for their routine needs, supports the argument here that even where 
there are large price differences between car-oriented and walkable retail, the underlying cost 
differences may be much smaller.  
The assumptions that walkable shops are in monopolistic competition and that car-oriented shops 
are in perfect competition, are also stylizations, but close enough to the world we observe to serve 
here. The perfect competition for the car-oriented market is simply a modeling convenience – a way 
of making the price level in car-oriented shops parametric, as with the outside option in Salop circle 
models (Salop 1979). Monopolistic competition in the local, walkable, market is a realistic 
assumption due both to the spatial nature of the problem (a limited walking range for shoppers, which 
both restricts the local market size and gives a shop in any particular location a downward sloping 
demand curve), and scale (locating within walking distance of residences makes these shops relatively 
small, which favors free entry). I ignore issues of multi-market strategic interaction, and assume that 
within a local market the competitors are the shops – that is, it is not an issue here if those shops are 
independent, or owned by large chains that also compete in local markets (it is worth noting that, 
when supermarket chains do operate both large car-oriented shops and smaller walkable shops, 
pricing tends to be distinctly higher in the latter).  
 
 
7 
The cost-minimizing way for drivers to reach car-oriented shops is by car; non-drivers use some 
other means – it is not important here whether that is a bus, bicycle, taxi, or a very long walk, but 
simply that the marginal cost of getting to a car-oriented shop is higher for a non-driver than for a 
driver. In both cases, we interpret the travel cost as a net cost - the difference between the cost of 
reaching the car-oriented shops, and that of travelling (walking) to local shops, including the relative 
costs of one-stop shopping in a hypermarket and multi-stop shopping in a series of small shops. 
Marginal cost is short run – by assumption, drivers are those who already have cars.  
The distance from the local area to the car-oriented shop is treated as exogenous. Travel costs vary 
across drivers and also across non-drivers. This variation of costs within each group represents 
differing personal circumstances: for drivers, for instance, this would include whether one already 
drives for work or for a school run; the walking distance to the local shops, and whether one is already 
walking for other purposes (e.g., from transit when arriving home from work); whether, at home, one 
has personally reserved parking, an expectation of easy on-street parking, or an expectation of a 
search for on-street parking; the fuel efficiency of one’s car; personal preferences as to driving and 
walking; and so forth.  
Now, the model. In a particular local area, let the equilibrium price in walkable shops be P
W
. The 
price in car-oriented shops is P
C
. There are N consumers in the local area, of whom some proportion, 
α, are non-drivers, and (1-α) are drivers.  For convenience, we assume that there is a well defined 
local area, within which all shops are walkable for all residents, number of those shops being M. 
Differences in travel costs are modeled as follows. Consumer j pays a travel cost, cj, to reach a car-
oriented shop. For drivers, cj is distributed uniformly across the interval [d, d + e], where d is the 
minimum travel cost and d + e is the maximum. The density of the distribution is given by 1/e at all 
points in the interval. For non-drivers, cj is distributed uniformly across the interval [f, f + g], where f 
is the minimum travel cost and f + g is the maximum. The density of the distribution is given by 1/g at 
all points in the interval. I assume that f > d + e: that is, the marginal travel cost for the non-driver 
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with the lowest travel cost is strictly greater than that for the driver with the highest marginal travel 
cost. The assumption that travel for shopping is generally more costly for non-drivers reflects the time 
and inconvenience required for doing a supermarket without a car. The strict difference between the 
extremes of the two cost distributions simplifies the presentation here; it is not fundamental to the 
model, but in any case, considering that this is a model of one local area, it is a reasonable 
assumption. Nothing in the model requires a particular sign for cj: for some consumers it may be less 
costly to drive to a car-oriented shop than to reach a walkable shop. 
For simplicity, I assume that each consumer makes an all-or-nothing choice between walkable 
shops and car-oriented shops. Thus, driver j will use the walkable shop if P
W
 < P
C
 + cj, and otherwise 
will drive. If P
W
 – PC > d + e, then PW > PC + cj for all drivers, and they all use car-oriented shops; 
conversely, if P
W
 – PC < d, all drivers use walkable shops. The same follows for non-drivers, 
substituting f and g for d and e as appropriate. 
There are ways in which the division between drivers and non-drivers, and the all-or-nothing 
choice between using walkable and car-oriented shops might be made more subtle. We could, for 
instance, have the price difference and the travel cost affect the distribution of purchases by each 
consumer across walkable and car-oriented shops, and the frequency of trips to car-oriented shops; in 
such a model, purchases at walkable shops might take the role played by inventories in McCann 
(1995). We could also endogenize car ownership, making it a function of the price difference between 
walkable and car-oriented shops. While such refinements might shed light on some additional issues, 
the simpler model presented here serves to establish some basic results. 
Assuming linear demand, each consumer's demand is given by the relation: 
Qj = a - bP  (1) 
Let 
WQ be the total demand faced by a representative walkable shop. The shop’s demand curve 
consists of four segments. Where P
W
 – PC > f + g, all consumer go to car-oriented shops, and there is 
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no demand for walkable shops.  Where f + g > P
W
 – PC > f, the proportion of non-drivers who buy 
locally varies with P
L
, so the walkable shop's demand curve is: 
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Where f > P
W
 – PC > d + e, all non-drivers go to walkable shops and all drivers go to car-oriented 
shops: 
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Where d + e > P
W
 – PC > d, the proportion of drivers who buy locally varies with PL, so the 
walkable shop's demand curve is 
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Finally, where d >  P
W
 – PC  and all purchases are done in walkable shops, and the representative 
walkable shop's demand curve is 
)./)(( MNbPaQ WW   (2.4) 
Details of the derivation of 2.1 and 2.3 are given in Appendix 1. Now, differentiating 2.1-2.4 with 
respect to P
W
, the slopes of the four segments are: 
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The second and fourth segments are both are linear and, since α < 1, the second (where all non-
drivers, and only non-drivers, use walkable shops) is steeper than the fourth (where all local 
consumers use walkable shops). The first and third segments are convex to the origin, with concave 
kinks where they join the linear segments to their right; the third segment has a convex kink where it 
joins the second segment, to its left (see Appendix)
1
. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Assuming free entry and exit by local shops with u-shaped long-run average cost curves, the 
monopolistic competition equilibrium may lie on any segment of the curve.  
Since a walkable shop has some fixed costs, the average cost explodes when Q becomes small; if 
the demand curve shifts far enough to the left there will be no (P
W
,Q
W
) combination at which even a 
single (M=1) walkable shop can meet its costs, and the neighborhood will support no walkable shops 
(Figure 1). In the limiting case – a single isolated house in the countryside – this is obvious.  
                                                   
1 The convex (inward) kink in this model contrasts with the concave (outward) kink of Salop (1979). 
Salop’s kink occurs at a point where two firms on the circle (analogous to the walkable shops here) 
are close enough together that their markets overlap. In Salop’s model, the flatter demand curve to the 
left of the kink is a “monopoly” zone (where the only competition is the outside option), while the 
steeper demand curve to the right is a “competitive” zone, where firms on the circle compete for 
customers. The firm’s demand curve less elastic in the competitive zone – something Salop (1979, p. 
144) calls an “unusual result” - because the assumptions of the model make this a transition from 
monopoly at the margin to Bertrand competition at the margin. Salop’s concave kink – following 
those of Lerner and Singer (1937) and Sweezy (1939) – produces a zone of sticky prices - where cost 
changes have little or no influence on price. 
The convex kink in the present model comes from differences in marginal travel costs for 
drivers and non-drivers. With a Sweezy-Salop concave kink, the interesting feature is a set of 
equilibria which are stuck on the kink – prices non-responsive to changes in cost. With the present 
model’s convex kink, the average cost curve, far from getting stuck in a tangency at the kink, is never 
tangent at the kink; rather than the possibility of getting stuck, we have the possibility of 
discontinuous adjustment, with a small change in travel costs for drivers (or, equivalently, a small 
change the price of the outside option) producing a discontinuous, and disproportionately large, 
change in local prices. The walkable shops are assumed always to be in monopolistic competition 
equilibrium of the Chamberlain type (Chamberlain 1933; Spence 1976). As with Salop’s model, the 
outside option is in perfect competition and the outside price is treated as exogenous.  
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I will refer to an equilibrium on the third or fourth segments of the curve as a low price 
equilibrium, and one on the first or second segments as a high price equilibrium. Notice, however, 
that prices in the high price zone will decline as the population density of non-drivers rises. This is a 
straightforward result of increased demand in the Chamberlain model. 
Differentiation of any segment of the demand curve confirms the intuition that demand faced by 
walkable shops increases both with residential density, and with the proportion of consumers who are 
not drivers. One implication of this is that for sufficiently large αN – which is to say, a sufficiently 
high density of non-drivers – walkable shops will be viable even if all drivers shop elsewhere.  
Now consider equilibria falling on either the second or the third segement of the demand curve. 
Start with one on the second segment – that is, one in which all non-drivers, and only non-drivers, 
shop in a representative walkable shop [Figure 2].  
[Figure 2 about here] 
What might lead drivers to choose the walkable shop?  Here we study the comparative statics of 
changes in either d (the minimum of the travel cost distribution) or P
C
 (the price level in car-oriented 
shops). By the assumptions of the model, an increase in d shifts the entire travel cost distribution up, 
and increases in d and P
C
 are equivalent. Here we use an increase in d, which is to say a positive 
shock to the travel costs for drivers. Differentiating 2.3 with respect to d gives us: 
0)/(
))(1(
d
d


 MN
e
bPa
d
Q WW 
. (4) 
So, an increase in travel costs raises demand in walkable shops; the second derivative is zero - 
under the assumptions of the model, the change in local demand is linear in travel costs. 
To see the effect of a change in drivers’ travel costs on the slope of the demand curve, we 
differentiate (3.3) with respect to d, obtaining: 
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Thus, a positive shock to d not only shifts the curve out, but also reduces the slope. The shift in the 
walkable shop's demand curve following a positive shock to d is shown in Figure 3 as the shift from 
DD' to DD''. 
When the initial equilibrium is on the second segment of the demand curve, as shown in Figure 2, 
an outward shift and flattening of the third segment of the demand curve will affect this equilibrium 
only if it raises the third segment far enough that it crosses the walkable shop's average cost curve. 
When this happens, however, the change is discontinuous, with the equilibrium tipping from high 
prices and low volumes to low prices and high volumes in walkable shops. A less technical way of 
expressing this is that the difference between the walkable and car-oriented shops in price-plus-travel-
costs has become small enough that walkable shops can compete on price for the custom of drivers. 
The dynamics of the tipping process are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. The outward shift of the 
demand curve makes positive profits available to walkable shops charging lower prices (Figure 3). 
New walkable shops then enter. The new entry divides local trade among more shops, shifting the 
demand curve for the representative walkable shop to the left, until a new equilibrium is reached: this 
is the shift, shown in Figure 4,  from DD'' to D*D**. The entry of additional walkable shops will, of 
course, raise the price elasticity of demand, further flattening all segments of the demand curve. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
The new equilibrium must be at a lower price level, and closer to the representative shop’s 
minimum average cost, due to the shape of the long-run average cost curve; moreover, entry has given 
us more walkable shops.  
Within the range d + e > P
W
 – PC > d, further rises in the cost of out-of-town shopping would lead 
to further reductions in local prices. Unlike the step-change illustrated above, however, in this range 
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we see incremental price reductions in response to incremental cost increases. However, this is a 
model of prices in a single local area, or neighborhood. Any metropolitan area or large town has 
multiple local market areas, with differing densities, proportions of drivers and non-drivers, and costs 
of travel to car-oriented retail. A positive shock to driving costs across an entire metropolitan area 
might tip walkable shops in some local areas from a high-price to a low-price equilibrium, while 
leaving others unaffected; an additional positive shock could tip the prices in another set of local 
areas. Thus, while rising travel costs will at some point produce a discontinuous price drop in a given 
neighborhood’s walkable shops, aggregated over a large metropolitan area the decline in walkable 
shop prices should appear continuous. 
 
 3. Implications of the model 
When it becomes cheaper for consumers who have cars to drive to buy, walkable shops can be 
relegated abruptly to serving only non-drivers; among walkable shops, the number of competitors, 
price level, and capacity utilization then become crucially dependent on the density of non-drivers. If 
car ownership is an increasing function of income, then holding residential density constant, the price 
gap between walkable- and car-oriented shops will, ceteris paribus, grow with household income.  
Although this result is couched in terms of price, we should not lose sight of the fact that it is a 
clear implication of the model that reduced product variety, reduced local competition, and increased 
distances between walkable shops, are all implied by the model as accompanying increased local 
price. In short, the high priced equilibrium in this model is one of degraded local retail services. 
The result has implications for inequality, through the distribution of purchasing power between 
drivers and non-drivers; for static efficiency; for the creation of urban land use and transport patterns 
which are consistent with sustainable patterns of resource use – particularly of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
production; and in general, for understanding the efficacious mix of planning and pricing on the 
shaping of the built environment. Let us consider each of these in turn. 
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3.1 The distribution of purchasing power, and food deserts 
The distributional implication of the model comes from the finding that when driving costs are 
sufficiently low that drivers go to car-oriented shops, those who depend on walkable shops pay more. 
If a neighborhood is heterogeneous with respect to income and car ownership is positively correlated 
with income, this means that the poor tend to pay more; similarly, independent of income, people 
unable to use cars pay more. Local income heterogeneity is of course at odds with models of the 
Alonso (1964) type, in which a city's residents are sorted and segregated spatially into internally 
homogeneous wealth or income groups. No neighborhood, however, is actually uniform with regard 
either to the income of its residents, or to their owning and being able to drive cars. The importance of 
the present model’s distributional implications depends on the degree of deviation from the pure 
Alonso case. This deviation may typically be greater in European, East Asian and Australasian cities 
than in North American ones. Even within a poor neighborhood in the US, however, use of a car will 
presumably be correlated with income.  
This finding enriches our understanding of “food deserts”. Research on the distribution of retail – 
particularly, food – stores in relation to household income and to racial or other social categories, has 
found that people in poor and minority neighborhoods are on average located further from 
supermarkets (Zenk, Schulz, Israel, et al. 2005, in a study of Detroit), pay more for their food (Hall 
1983, studying both New York boroughs and two counties in upstate New York), and have access to a 
reduced variety – particularly, of fresh healthy food (Zenk, Schulz, Hollis-Neely, et al. 2005, Detroit 
again); the arrival of a supermarket in a former food desert can have a substantial positive impact for 
both household budgets and nutrition (Wrigley et al. 2003, Leeds). Larsen and Gilliland (2008), in a 
study of London, Ontario, find that this inequality has grown worse over the decades, as supermarkets 
have moved to more suburban locations; they also find that poor neighborhoods tend to have inferior 
access to supermarkets even when access is assumed to be by bus. Whelen et al (2002) show, again in 
 
 
15 
the case of Leeds, poor, disabled or elderly consumers do reach supermarkets in a variety of ways, 
ways which are often costly in terms of time, comfort, the need for planning, or simple dignity.  
The focus, in this literature, on access to supermarkets, follows from the fact that smaller stores 
tend to have higher prices and less variety (e.g. Alwitt and Donley 1997, studying Minneapolis/St 
Paul and Chicago, respectively; Chung and Myers 1999). Yet the smaller stores do exist, and in some 
cases offer a good selection of fresh foods; Raja et al (2008) find, in their study of Erie County 
(Buffalo and environs), New York, that residents of predominantly black or mixed race 
neighborhoods who are not driving face substantially longer trips to supermarkets than non-driving 
residents of predominantly white neighborhoods, but are actually closer to small grocery stores, 
greengrocers, and butchers. While, whatever the neighborhood’s ethnic composition, few of Erie 
County residents are within easy walking distance of either a supermarket or smaller retail food 
stores, Raja et al argue that improved access to food in under-served areas might better come from 
promoting small shops than from adding supermarkets. 
The model presented in this paper does not tell us why residents of poor and minority 
neighborhoods have inferior access to supermarkets, but it does help us understand the implications of 
being without one: not only does competition from low-cost (and, generally, car-oriented) 
supermarkets drive many walkable shops out of business, but it can actually raise prices and reduce 
the capacity utilization in the remaining walkable shops. Note that in food retailing, one implication of 
reduced capacity utilization is a rising relative cost of handling perishables, in particular the fresh 
foods said to be scarce in food deserts.  
  
3.2. Allocative Efficiency and Environmental Sustainability 
Even ignoring the distributional effects, we note that when drivers use car-oriented shops, the 
allocation of resources is likely to be inefficient. There are two reasons for this. One is that, in 
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monopolistic competition equilibrium, higher prices are associated with greater excess capacity in 
each walkable shop
2
. The other is that there are numerous external costs to car use.  
Walkable shops and car-oriented shops are elements of two distinct logistical approaches to the 
delivery of retail goods and services. The car-oriented version requires more road traffic, which in 
turn produces external costs. Assessments of the external costs of road traffic are often restricted to 
direct costs in the existing built environment with the existing transport system, in many cases dealing 
exclusively with traffic congestion (e.g. Calthrop et al. 2000; Mun et al. 2005; Arnott and Rowse 
2009); studies with this narrow focus treat the control of road traffic as a collective action problem 
among drivers, largely ignoring costs imposed on those who are, or would prefer to be, non-drivers. 
Some analysts attempt also to address such externalities as air pollution, both local (smog, small 
particulates) and global (CO2); the value of rural open space; and the cost of subsidizing suburban 
infrastructure (e.g. Brueckner 2000). Even this list, however, fails to exhaust the external costs of car 
use: road traffic makes walking and cycling less safe, and thus creates a serious restriction of 
transportation choice, a curtailment of social space and, through reduced exercise, a significant public 
health problem (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2002); as shown in this paper, one 
consumer’s driving can raise the prices in walkable retail for others; moreover, parking spaces have 
external costs independent of the driving they are associated with – impermeable surface lots, which 
cover substantial portions of car-oriented shopping districts (Akbari et al. 2003), and are significant 
contributors to groundwater depletion, water pollution, flooding, and urban heat islands (Arnold and 
Gibbons 1996). 
For many of these effects, we must reckon not only a direct external cost, but also both immediate 
and long-term secondary effects from induced driving (Cervero and Hansen 2002; Cervero 2003). The 
                                                   
2 This is the case, at any rate, in the simple Chamberlain-type model used here; it also accords with 
casual observation several measures of capacity utilization in UK high streets and US town centers: 
vacancy rates; the shifting of shop spaces to less intensive (second-hand stories, bookies, offices) or 
even residential use; and the evidently slow pace of business in many remaining shops. That said, in 
different formal models, the capacity utilization result is not straightforward: see Gu and Wenzel 
(2009). 
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conditions created by driving – unsafe or unpleasant pedestrian or cycling environments, high local 
prices - raise the cost of not driving; acts of driving also tend to induce further driving by the driver, 
since the fixed costs of keeping a car – or of taking it out of a scarce on-street parking space 
(Weinberger 2012) – mean that the marginal private cost of car use is below average cost. To the 
extent that the built environment is rebuilt in response to uncoordinated demand rather than resource 
conserving planning, driving induces reduced density and, per the model here, undermines walkable 
retail. The external costs of such changes in the built environment are not small. The public fiscal 
costs of low density development are very high (Ewing 1997; Blais 2010), for instance. In the critical 
area of GHGs, Norman et al (2006) find that when a range of inputs are taken into account – 
construction materials, building operations, and transport – find that car-friendly low density parts of 
Toronto produce between 2 and 2.5 times the CO2 equivalents, per capita, of higher density parts of 
the same city; see also Wegener’s (1996) study of Dortmund.  
Estimating this collection of costs is no simple task. Overall external costs of car use are higher, 
per distance travelled, in towns than they are in rural areas. GHG emissions are a linear function of 
fuel use, and close to linear in the distance travelled by a particular vehicle; all of the other costs 
mentioned are much greater, per distance travelled in a particular vehicle, when the travel is in and 
around towns and cities; some of the costs are the same for an electric car and an old gas guzzler. 
Litman (2009) estimates that the external costs of urban driving in North America are from 160% (off 
peak) to 250% (peak) of those rural driving. On average, he finds the monetized private costs of 
driving greater than private variable costs, but how much greater is difficult to say: his range of 
“plausible” estimates for the external costs of a weighted average of rural, urban peak, & urban off-
peak driving runs from around $0.15 to over $0.90 per mile. If we consider that the range for urban 
driving will be higher than this (40% of driving, in Litman’s formula, is rural), then internalizing these 
costs in the case of shopping trips could have a noticeable impact on effective prices in car-oriented 
shops; this, in turn, would have the effect of shifting prices in some walkable shops downwards. 
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(Litman’s estimates do not appear to include increased non-transport GHG emissions among the costs 
of induced low density.) 
 
3.3 Policy Implications 
Our ability to draw precise policy conclusions recommendations from the model presented here, is 
limited by the facts that available estimates of the overall level of externalities from automobile use 
are not very precise, and that we do not know what magnitude of increases private travel cost (or, 
equivalently, prices in car-oriented shops) would be required to tip walkable shops in some local areas 
into a low-price equilibrium. The model does, however, have clear qualitative policy implications in 
the areas of land use planning, road pricing, and the pricing of parking.  
Where pricing of externalities is incomplete, land use planning can provide a second best means of 
internalizing costs (Pines and Sadka 1985; Ruth 2006). Higher residential density, for instance, favors 
walkable shops, other things equal. Yet, high density may be insufficient to maintain a low-price 
equilibrium in walkable shops if most consumers have cars, driving is underpriced, and car-oriented 
retail is available. This helps explain why the US Transportation Research Board (2009) finds that 
increasing residential density in US cities would have only a small effect on energy use and CO2 
emissions: giving Atlanta the residential and transit patterns of Boston (the USTRB’s most extreme 
and optimistic thought experiment) still yields an urban area in which most people drive cars to buy 
groceries. Brownstone and Golub’s (2009) findings point in the same direction.  
With adequate residential densities, walkable retail might be kept in a low-price equilibrium by 
severe and thorough planning restrictions on car-oriented retail. Kristensen and Tkocz (1994) find 
that, in Copenhagen, consumers with cars travel no further for shopping than those without; in smaller 
Danish towns, where prices are higher, drivers travel further than non-drivers. Knowles (2012) 
describes the impact of more recent transit-oriented development in the Copenhagen area in ways 
consistent with this account. This speaks to the power of planning (though, from the research cited, 
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we do not know the respective effects of planning for residential density and planning for retail 
location), and it is consistent with the model presented here; it says little about what to do with towns 
and cities where planning is (or, in the past, has been) less exacting than in Denmark, or for that 
matter what to do in the smaller Danish cities and towns in Kristensen and Tkocz’s study. Where 
significant car-oriented retail capacity already exists, restrictions on new car-oriented retail 
development may simply secure rents for incumbent car-oriented retailers while doing little for 
walkability. And, where whole cities have been built (or re-built) around automobile transport, the 
problem is not so much one of planning new development, as “retrofitting” of places that are now car-
oriented (Dunham-Jones and Williamson 2011); in such cases, the existing stock of car-oriented 
shopping could forestall the emergence of low-price walkable retail.  
Consider, next, the pricing of road use, and of parking. As noted above, Litman finds that 
aggregate externalities from urban driving are far higher than those for rural driving. Hence, a tax on 
motor fuel, or CO2 equivalents, if it does not overprice rural and long-distance driving, will under-
price driving for shopping, most of which occurs in or around towns. More focused road pricing 
measures usually take one of two forms: cordon pricing measures aimed at reducing automobile trips 
into city centers (Albalate and Bel 2009),  or tolls on congested inter-urban roads or selected 
commuting bottlenecks. Inter-urban tolls, other things equal, simply aggravate the relative under-
pricing of urban driving. Restricting traffic into city centers may create a better environment for 
walkable retail in the center, but it leaves a large ring – a donut of town, suburb, and ex-urb, within 
which most driving-to-shop actually occurs - in which traffic is under-priced. Moreover, since such 
schemes typically have exemptions for people who live in the restricted areas, outward mobility to 
car-oriented shops is protected, potentially leaving city-center shops with very limited markets and 
relegating them to the high-priced convenience store role depicted above.  
In short, fuel taxes and inter-urban tolls under-price driving in towns, while existing congestion 
charges under-price driving outside of the CBD: in combination, this amounts to a subsidy for driving 
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in urban areas outside of congestion-priced zones, and throughout smaller towns and suburbia. In the 
absence of more fine-grained road pricing, prices for parking offer a potential solution. The price of 
parking is whatever is charged to drivers for using a parking space; taxes on parking may be 
incorporated into parking prices, or may – if, say, levied on a retailer’s private parking spaces – be 
absorbed into the cost base of some other activity. For the purposes of this paper, we assume that a 
parking tax levied on the retailer will be passed on to consumers in prices, and has a behavioral effect 
similar to that of a direct tax.  
As with road pricing, much analysis of parking prices has been framed as a solution to collective 
action problems among drivers (Roth 1965; Shoup 2005; Arnott and Rowse 2009): on-street parking 
prices are too low for these authors if drivers need to cruise for parking too long. As with road pricing, 
this again lead to a focus on congested town centers; while Shoup rightly lambastes excessive, 
formula-driven parking minima, it is not clear that relaxing or even eliminating these requirements 
would do anything to reduce the amount of parking voluntarily chosen by the proprietors of car-
oriented supermarkets and shopping malls. More generally, if implemented with the objective of 
reducing the time needed to find a parking space, rationing parking by price would not fully 
internalize the costs of driving, and could in some settings have the perverse effect of encouraging 
driving if not coupled with strict maxima on parking spaces. And, in focusing on the problem of 
underpriced on-street parking and over-provided off-street parking, these studies ignore the fact that 
in many old shopping districts, the specter of underpriced on-street parking has long since been 
banished: in the author’s neighborhood in north London, about 5km from the congestion pricing zone, 
scarce non-resident on-street spaces in a thriving walkable shopping district are full even though 
priced at £3 (about $4.80) per hour, 9.5 hours per day, 6 days per week. Allowing for holidays, and 
assuming full occupancy but ignoring additional charges (fines) for over-staying, this gives us a price 
of £8,607 ($13,771) per year. The main roads are congested with cars driving to and from nearby 
supermarkets, which have made ample and voluntary private provision of parking for their customers, 
avoiding any such tax. This offers us a nice thought experiment: what would be the behavioral 
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implications – for the consumer in the short run, and the supermarket operator as it plans future 
development of its properties – of taxing all retail parking spaces at the same high level? 
Clearly, the pricing of parking can be used not simply to reduce cruising for spaces, but with the 
aim of internalizing a wide range of the external costs discussed above (Barter 2010). Feitelson and 
Rotem (2004) argue for a flat tax on surface parking, on the grounds both that surface parking entails 
particular externalities, as noted above, and that such a tax is easily administered; more complex 
alternatives, which address the total parking space used and/or the number of parking acts, have been 
widely considered (Marsden 2006). 
 
4. Conclusion 
Low-priced car-oriented retail can raise prices in walkable shops. When consumers include both 
drivers and non-drivers, a walkable shop’s demand curve has a concave kink - opposite of the kink in 
Sweezy-Salop models. The model has distributional implications because it shows a mechanism by 
which non-drivers, who tend to have lower incomes, are burdened with higher costs.  The finding that 
a small cost advantage for car-oriented retailers can lead to a disproportionately large price advantage 
also has important implications for environmental and urban policy: internalizing environmental and 
social costs of driving could lower prices in walkable shops, at least in neighborhoods with higher 
population densities; planning tools on their own are unlikely to be adequate for this task, while the 
most common pricing  tools (taxes on fuel, on congestion, and public parking) perversely under-price  
much driving-to-shop. A tax on parking – including, at least, all retail parking – could fill this gap. 
How widely this approach would actually raise car-oriented costs enough to produce low-price 
equilibria for walkable shops, and the euthanasia of the strip mall, remains to be seen. 
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Appendix 1: Equations 2.1 and 2.3 
The following is framed with reference to equation 2.3, but with appropriate substitutions of f and 
g for d and e, it applies to equation 2.1 as well. 
In equation 2.3, the term  
e
PedP WC  )(
 (A.1)  
represents the proportion of drivers who use walkable shops, a proportion which changes as P
L 
changes. When P
L
 = P
O 
+(d+e), the lowest local price at which all drivers use car-oriented shpos, the 
numerator and the proportion both equal zero. When P
L
 = P
O 
+ d, the walkable shop price below 
which all drivers use walkable shops, the proportion is 1; we can see this by substituting P
O 
+ d for P
L
 
in the numerator. Under the assumption that the distribution of costs is uniform within the [d,d+e] 
range, the proportion of those shopping locally is, within the relevant range, a linear function of P
L
. 
However, under the assumption that demand from those consumers who shop in a given area is linear, 
the demand curve faced by the representative local shop is not linear in this range, because a change 
in price causes both a linear change in the proportion shopping locally, and a linear change in the 
quantity purchased by each consumer; the interaction of these gives us a quadratic in P
L
. 
The second derivative of 2.2 is  
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so the central segment is convex to the origin. At the left-hand (upper) end of the middle segment, 
where 
LO PedP  approaches zero, its slope approaches  
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which is flatter than the first segment's )/( MNb : the curve is kinked where these two segments 
join, and remains convex to the origin. At the other end of the middle segment, where 
LO PedP  approaches e, the slope approaches  
  
),/(
1
MN
e
bPa
b
L





 


 (A.4) 
which is flatter than the third segment's slope of )./( MNb  Thus the curve is kinked here, too, but 
this time the kink is concave to the origin. 
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Minimum travel cost for drivers rises from d1 
to d2, shifting demand curve for walkable 
shops, and creating profit opportunities for 
walkable shops at lower price levels. 
D'' 
PW-PC = d1+e 
PW-PC = d2  
  
 
 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
D** 
D* 
D 
LRAC 
PW 
QW 
D'' 
QW2 
PW2 
Figure 4 
Entry of new walkable shops shifts demand 
curve for representative walkable shop to the 
left. New monopolistic competition 
equilibrium at lower price (PW2) and higher 
capacity utilization (QW2). 
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